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Introduction
The component approach to building systems is gaining audience because of the interesting properties of components. We can imagine that software will soon be very large collections of components and that the reuse and sharing of components will be common practice. However, components are often developed by different groups and their dependencies are not clearly specified. Hence installing (or deinstalling) a component is often a gamble since all the dependencies are difficult to find. Using current approaches, installation may not achieve success [15] (an installed component does not work) and installation or deinstallation may not be safe and disrupt the system. To face the evolution towards component based systems, our aim is to build a tool with formal foundations ensuring the success and safety of deployment.
In this paper, we present the formalization of a static deployment system that ensures the success and safety of installation and deinstallation. What is meant by static is that we do not address the dynamic reconfiguration of the interconnection in the system yet. The work presented here does not take into account the concrete realization of the deployment operations. We only present a reasoning framework to authorize or forbid deployment. Furthermore, our work is based on the fact that components come with an exact 3 description of their requirements and effect on the system. The central concept is the notion of dependency that abstracts the link between component and hardware requirements. Dependencies are used during installation to ensure the requirements are fulfilled and during deinstallation to guarantee that they still be fulfilled. This paper defines dependencies, how they are specified and describes how to properly manage them during installation and deinstallation. This paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 introduces the concept of component deployment and illustrates deployment dependencies using the example of a mail server. Next, section 3 presents our description of dependency deployment and section 4 the description of environmental constraints. Then, in section 5 and section 6 we present a formalization of the installation and deinstallation of components and the management of their effect on the target system respectively. Finally, we discuss related work in section 7 and conclude this article by presenting some future work in section 8.
Component deployment
In this paper, we use a basic abstract notion of component. A component provides services that require services. Components and services are identified by their names. A required service is specified giving its name (and possibly the name of its provider). This work can be applied to any component model supporting named services and components and the notions of required and provided services.
Notice that using names to specify requirements would require to have some component and service dictionnary. In an open setting this requirement can be a limitation but is already used in practice by the packaging systems of Linux. To overcome this limitation, work is needed to enable the use of other form of identity for services and components (such as, for example, interface types for services).
A component software is a set of interconnected components. This interconnection is the software architecture and is often designed using an Architecture Description Language (ADL) such as Fractal ADL [3] or xADL [10] . Fig. 1 illustrates such an architecture for a mail server on a Linux system. It is composed of four components: Postfix, an SMTP server playing the role of a Mail Transport Agent (MTA), Fetchmail that allows to recover mail by an electronic mail transport protocol (e.g., Pop) from a distant host (the messages are redirected to the local transport), Procmail, a Mail Deliver Agent (MDA) that manages received mails and allows, for example, the filtering of a mail. Finally, Sylpheed, a mail manager for reading and composing mail called a Mail User Agent (MUA).
The installation/deinstallation of a component in/from a system corresponds to its addition/removal to/from the system. The success of these actions requires that:
(i) The system provides the resources and the services required by the component (being installed To answer these questions, we need (1) the resources of the target system (2) its architecture and (3) the component description.
The resources are here abstracted by a set of environment variables. We suppose that a standard choice of names and valuations for the resource description (for example the Management Information Format [5] ) is made. The values are obtained by sensors and therefore will not be modified by our rules.
The architecture of the system memorizes the interconnection between all components in the system. Such a complete explicit architecture (if it exists) would be unmanageable because of its size. Furthermore, constructing it can be very difficult as dependencies are often partly hidden. Therefore, rather than supervising all the installation and deinstallation scripts, we advocate the use of an approximation of the inter-dependencies between components. This approximation is discussed in greater detail in section 4.
The description of a component must be sufficiently precise to express the links of a provided service to its requirements. This gray-box description specifies intradependencies which are parametrized contracts [17] , that is, outputs (provided services) are linked to the entries (required services) they depend on. The form of these links is defined in the next section.
illustrates dependencies in Fig. 1 4 . There is three main forms of dependencies, a dependency is either mandatory, optional or negative:
• a mandatory dependency (represented by a solid line) is a firm requirement. If it is not fulfilled installation is not possible. For example, the mail server needs a terminal with a specific CPU or specific libraries, etc.
• an optional dependency (represented by a dotted line) specifies that the component may provide optional services. Such services may not be provided (if their requirements are not fulfilled) without preventing the installation. For example, postfix may provide a service for scanning messages against viruses if the service Amavis is available. Otherwise postfix can be installed and provides the MTA service, but the service AV is not provided.
• a negative dependency (expressed by a negation) specifies a conflict forbidding installation. The conflict may hold with a service or a component. For example, postfix cannot be installed if another MTA is already installed (such as sendmail for example).
The (intra-)dependency description language 5 uses the concepts of dependency and predicate defined by the following grammar where s represents the name of a service and c the name of a component:
The precise semantics of these operators will be defined by the installability and installation rules (resp. Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 ). Intuitively, a dependency may be the conjunction • or the disjunction of two dependencies, an optional dependency ? or a simple dependency P ⇒ s specifying the requirements P of a service s. The requirements are expressed in a first order predicate language in conjunctive normal form to simplify the installation rules. It is important to notice that a component may forbid a service it provides. This feature can be used by a component providing s to forbid the (future) installation of any other component providing s (¬ s ⇒ s).
Context description
The resources and the architecture of the target system are modeled by the notion of context. Ideally, it could be the union of the dependencies of all components (part of the system). But, the calculation (and the manipulation) of this union is not realistic. Thus, a safe approximation (of this union) is needed. Fig. 1 safe installation, we have to know the available services (with their providers) and installed components to check services' requirements and conflicts. We also need the values of the environment variables. For safe deinstallation, we need to keep all potential dependencies between services.
In this paper, the Context is composed of (1) an environment E storing the values of variables, (2) a set C of four-tuples (c, P s , F s , F c ) storing for each installed component c its provided services P s , forbidden services F s and forbidden components F c and (3) a dependency graph G storing the dependencies. A node of G is an available service and its provider (c.s) and an edge is a pair of nodes n 1 − → n 2 meaning that n 2 requires n 1 . Each edge is labeled (above the arrow) by the kind of dependency, either mandatory M or optional O. Fig. 2 presents the dependency graph of the mail server of Fig. 1 . A dependency graph is defined by the set of its labeled edges. It is built during installation and used during deinstallation. This means that an edge n 1 − → n 2 in G denotes that n 2 is available and requires n 1 . It implies that n 1 was available before n 2 , that is the graph does not contain cycles. In practice this can be a limitation because two components may be mutually dependent. We think that such circularity should be solved 6 by building composite components that hides this circularity to the system. This composition operation is not yet available and left for future work.
To simplify the presentation of our rules, let us define available / forbidden services and components 7 :
Safe installation
In our approach, abstract installation is carried out in two stages (see Fig. 3 ). First we check whether installation is possible (installability) by evaluating the component dependency in the current context. Then if installation is possible, we calculate its effect on the context. This effect is used to update the abstract context once the concrete installation has been carried out. CComp:
The checking rules of Fig. 4 ensure that mandatory dependencies of the component are verified. For a simple dependency P ⇒ s, this means that P evaluates to true and s is not forbidden (CTriv). The evaluation of a predicate P in the context Ctx follows classical logic and is presented in the first part of the figure (rules Ctx P P ). During this stage, optional dependencies are ignored (COpt) because such dependencies may be unavailable without preventing component installation. The conjunction of dependencies is resolved when the two dependencies are valid (CAnd) and their disjunction when one of the two dependencies is valid (COrL and COrR).
Installation
Once the component is proved to be installable, we need to calculate the effect of its installation on the system. This effect consists of new available services, new forbidden services, new forbidden components and a new dependencies (represented by a dependency graph). Before giving the installation rules, we will show how this effect is calculated by defining two operations: CalcF that determines forbidden services and components and the dependency graph calculation.
First, the services and components forbidden by a component are calculated by collecting negatives of the predicates of its dependency. This is done by the function CalcF defined below.
The only case that deserve discussion is the disjunction. Indeed, several subterms of a disjunction may forbid services (or components). For example, in the 6
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COrR: Here if a is available (resp. b) we could keep ¬ b (resp. ¬ a) and while none of them is available we keep the disjunction. We have chosen to present here a simpler system because we think that the benefit in terms of precision is not worth its cost. That is all services and components with negative predicates in a disjunction are forbidden (the set of forbidden services in the case of disjunction are the same as in that of conjunction).
Definition 5.2 (CalcF) The function CalcF calculates the set of forbidden services and the set of forbidden components from a predicate: The only rules causing new dependencies are those specifying service requirements. The rule GServ adds a dependency between each potential provider of a service and the service requiring it. The rule GServC ensures that c provides s and produces the corresponding dependency.
Lastly, the installation is defined by:
Definition 5.4 (Installation) The installation of a component c with a dependency D in a context Ctx has four effects: provided services P s , forbidden services F s , forbidden components F c and dependencies (graph G). These effects are obtained by the rules of Fig. 6 .
IComp:
The effect of P ⇒ s is undefined if either P is false (INot 1 ) or s is forbidden (INot 2 ). Otherwise, s is available, forbidden services and components are calculated by CalcF and the graph by the rules of Fig. 5 (ITriv) . An optional dependency ? D has almost the same effect as D if it is defined (IOpt 1 ), and the dependencies of D are converted to optional. Otherwise it has no effect (IOpt 2 ). In a conjunction D 1 • D 2 , D 1 and D 2 must be valid and then the effect is the union of their effects (IAnd 3 ). Otherwise it is undefined (IAnd 1 and IAnd 2 ). Lastly, the effect of a disjunction D 1 # D 2 is that of D 1 (IOrL) if D 1 is verified, or that of D 2 (IOrR) in the opposite case. Notice that the disjunction has the semantics of an if, the second dependency is used only if the first is not verified.
In this paper, we consider that our formal reasoning engine does not take care of updating environment variables. A concrete deployment engine updates the physical context and sensors bring it to the formal engine.
An example of installation
Let's illustrate the installation of the component postfix whose dependency is
The installability of postfix is deduced by the proof presented in the first part of Fig. 7 . This proof ensures that libraries are present, sendmail is not present, the free disk size (F DS) is bigger than the required one and the provided service S M T A is not forbidden. Note that as the requirement for S Amavis is optional, it is not explored.
As postfix is installable, the installation stage follows and calculates the effect 9
Installability:
≥ 1380
Ctx P F DS ≥ 1380
Installation: Fig. 7 (the requirement predicate of S M T A is denoted P ). During this phase, the optional dependency is checked to determine whether it provides services (here it contributes the S AV service). After the installation of postfix, the MTA service (S M T A ) and the anti-virus (S AV ) are provided and the component sendmail (C SM ) becomes forbidden. The dependency graph G corresponds to the union of the dependency graphs deduced from the two sub-dependencies, that is
Therefore, after the installation of postfix the context becomes: Fig. 8 . An example of a dependency graph
Safe deinstallation
Deinstallation of a component c is also carried out in two stages. First, we check its feasibility by ensuring (using the dependency graph) that no service provided by c is required by another component. Then, we calculate the effect of deinstallation, that is, the removal of c from the context and of edges relating to the services that c provides in the dependency graph.
To manage deinstallation, we use the dependency graph built during installation. A component can be removed, if none of its provided services are used by other components. Therefore, for each provided service, we have to check that no (mandatory) service of another component requires it. Thus, a service can be removed if either it is not used (i.e., it is a leaf of the dependency graph) or it is only required (directly or indirectly) by optional services (in the graph, all paths coming from it must be composed of green arcs). The effect of the deinstallation of a component c on a context Ctx involves the set of nodes that must be removed from the dependency graph. This set of nodes contains all provided services of c and all (optional) services depending on them. Once the concrete deinstallation is carried out, Ctx will be updated by removing c (and its provided services, forbidden services and forbidden components) from C and removing 8 from G all nodes of the effect. Let us examine the deinstallation of the component LDAP-Perl and thus the removal of the service S LDAP −Perl . According to the deinstallability definition 6.2, we need to determine MD. On the left hand side of Fig. 9 , we can see that in the dependency graph, all paths depending on this service have optional arcs. Indeed, this service is only used (optionally) by APACHE and then SVN. So, MD is empty and Perl-LDAP can be deinstalled. According to definition 6.4, to remove S LDAP −Perl , we must remove all nodes depending on it. The calculus of OD gives {S WebAuthLDAP , S SVNAuthLDAP }. Thus, these services are removed while the components APACHE and SVN remain installed. The resulting dependency graph is shown on the right hand side of Fig 9) .
Related work
A lot of research focuses on the description and the management of component-based systems. Deployment tools such as COACH [9] and deployment specifications such as of the OMG [13] do not support the description of deployment dependency. The constraint one may express in those framework is limited to constraints on the target environment.
In architecture description languages (ADL) [12, 6] , descriptions focus on the structural view and concentrate on a high level logical view of components without taking into account the physical view (real effect on physical environment). Behavioral ADL exists such as π-ADL [14] but do not address the problem of deployment. To our knowledge, [8] is the only work extending an ADL to specify deployment constraints. Their approach is to describe constraints on the location of components. These constraints enable to describe requirements on hardware, simple software dependencies and co-location. However, ignoring the problem of deinstallation they do not have to handle software dependencies. Our work aims to encompass both the logical and physical views in descriptions offering of an expressive language for the deployment constraints specifications. For this, we follow [17] using parametrized conditions to specify dependencies (i.e., the provided services differ according to available services). In Reussner paper, this approach is limited to the specification of quality attributes.
In [11] an architecture for the representation and the management of dependencies in component systems is proposed. This representation is used for component implementation, which are configured and adapted automatically to dynamic changes in the environment. In this work, dependency descriptions are assumed to be already present and consistent, while in our approach, we aim to prove the consistency of the specifications.
Lastly, little work examine safety of deployment. The EDOS project aims to manage dependencies among large collections of software packages. They build a formal system [16] to check installability. In their context, installability is a lot harder than our, because if the system does not allow a component to be installed they try to determine which minimal set of packages is necessary to enable the installation. They prove that this problem is NP-complete but show that this is not a problem in practice. Another work presented in [18] deals with the problem of software configuration management. It formalizes the package system of Debian by defining a rule-based formal language for representation of configuration knowledge. Each rule (expressing a requirement) is translated to a logic program using the stable model semantics [7] . This work focuses on this particular form of semantics rather than the management of complex dependencies.
The two last works are related to the management of software packages of the Debian linux distribution. The main difference between packages and components is the fact that a package only provide one service 9 . Furthermore a component may provide a variable number of services depending on the context. A much richer dependency language is required to take into account these two differences. This paper introduces such a language with rules to ensure the safety of installation and deinstallation.
In this paper, a formalization of installation and deinstallation of components has been presented. It aims at providing a safe deployment framework that guarantee the success of installation and deinstallation. The key concept to offer this safety is the notion of dependency. A dependency abstract a components connection, it is mandatory or optional, positive (required) or negative (forbidden). The description and the management of these dependencies encompass our previous work [2, 1] by extending the syntax of requirements (allowing the provider specification) and introducing the notion of dependency graph. All potential dependencies are approximated by this dependency graph (built during installation) in order to ensure safe deinstallation. A simple prototype associated to a prover has been developed in OCaml. This proof of concept prototype is currently used to test our approach on the deployment of Fractal components [4] .
We are working on two main directions. First, our objective is to ensure the guarantee of the deployment. For this, a formalization of the properties a deployment system should respect (success, safety, . . . ) is needed. The goal is then to prove that our system ensure these properties. The second direction is to extends our system to overcome its current limitations. The two main limitations are:
• the deployment operations offered, a replace and an assembly operation are needed. The replace operation is needed to allow the upgrade of a component. Indeed as our system does not allow to deinstall a component providing services used by other components, upgrading a component is not equivalent to a deinstallation and then an installation. The assembly operation is needed to calculate the dependency of a composite component using the dependencies of its sub-components.
• the component and the service identities, in our current approach names hold a central position that they should not have. The identity of a service must be extended to include interface type and version information. This means to change from name equality to a form of subtyping when determining dependencies between services.
